the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated and remanded the case on appeal, finding that Brown's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination had been violated due to improper application of the statute by the trial court. 16 In August 2011, the trial court reversed its earlier decision and transferred Jordan Brown's case to the juvenile division of the court. 17 The ruling that Jordan Brown would be tried as an adult was controversial on its face, as Jordan was only eleven years old when he allegedly committed the crime. While some criticized the trial court judge for ruling that an eleven-year-old must stand trial as an adult, 18 those criticisms were specious, as the judge did properly apply the law. There is a more fundamental problem. Many transfer hearings, also known as "decertification hearings," often boil down to whether the juvenile is amenable to treatment in the juvenile facility. 19 As in Jordan Brown's case, it seemed that in order to show amenability to treatment, the child must have had to take responsibility for the crime. As noted in Brown I, "[T]he first step towards rehabilitation is to take responsibility for the underlying offense." 20 In cases such as these, it is not the reasoning of the courts that is flawed, but the law itself. Pennsylvania's juvenile transfer statute puts the child in a type of catch-22: admit to the crime and be tried as a juvenile or maintain innocence and be tried in the adult criminal justice system. Therefore, while the Superior Court's ruling in Brown's case was beneficial to him, it will not stop the problem from recurring in other juvenile cases. The Pennsylvania legislature should take steps to reform the statute or insert additional safeguards so that the Fifth Amendment rights of juveniles are not compromised in transfer proceedings.
Part II of this note will discuss the history of the juvenile system and the juvenile transfer mechanism. Part III will examine the current statutory and case 15 18 See, e.g., Andrea Canning & Maggie Burbank, Jordan Brown Murder Case Takes Emotional Toll, ABC NIGHTLINE (Apr. 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/jordan-brown-murder-case-12-yearadult/story?id=10288704&page=3#.TwSvZxyofV8 ("I think the judge's decision in this case is both disappointing, and I think, misinformed . . . . The judge is saying in order to be tried as a juvenile you need to admit that you've done the crime. That doesn't seem quite right to me."). 19 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(G) (2006) . 20 Brown I, 2010 WL 5763593, at *6. law governing juvenile transfers to and from the criminal system in Pennsylvania. Part IV of this note will demonstrate, through Pennsylvania case law and that of other jurisdictions with similar statutes, that the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act is flawed, as it implicitly requires juveniles to admit guilt without immunizing those incriminating statements from use in decertification proceedings. Finally, Part V will examine the implications of reforming the Juvenile Act. This note will argue that public policy merits these changes, even though it may mean that fewer juveniles are tried in the adult criminal system.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

A. The History of the Juvenile Court
The juvenile court first emerged in 1899 in Chicago, Illinois. 21 It differed from the criminal system in various ways, but the most significant difference between the two systems was their respective goals. While the criminal court system focused mainly on traditional retribution with the goal of punishment, the purpose of the juvenile system was to rehabilitate children and to "prevent them from entering a lifetime of crime." 22 The focus was on the juvenile as an individual and, thus, on providing him or her with individualized services and treatment. 23 At its inception, juvenile jurisdiction was based on the doctrine of parens patriae, which describes the role of the state as "guardian of persons under legal disability," such as juveniles. 24 Therefore, the juvenile offender was seen as needing the state's care, guidance, and help in rehabilitation. 25 The ultimate philosophy of the juvenile system was that:
[T]he child who has begun to go wrong, who is incorrigible, who has broken a law or an ordinance, is to be taken in hand by the state, not as an enemy but as a protector, as the ultimate guardian, because either the unwillingness or inability 
of the natural parents to guide it toward good citizenship has compelled the intervention of the public authorities.
26
The rationale behind the rehabilitative approach stemmed from the beliefs of nineteenth-century common law and society that children were not fully responsible for their actions. 27 Therefore, they "should be shielded from the punishment that would be exacted from a responsible actor," in other words, an adult. 28 Thus, the juvenile court was made as a separate forum to address the special needs of children with a heavy emphasis on social and psychological inquiries. 29 Moreover, judges had broad discretion to make decisions that were considered to be in the best interest of the child.
30
Another difference in the goals of the criminal and juvenile systems was marked by the juvenile system's attempts to eliminate the stigma of criminalization. 31 For example, instead of declaring the child "convicted" or "guilty," the juvenile would be adjudicated "delinquent" or "in need of the court's help"; the juvenile offender was not labeled a criminal, but was labeled "delinquent"; the proceedings were private, unlike the public proceedings of a criminal trial; and finally, the proceedings were considered civil and not criminal in nature. 32 Each of these elements of the juvenile system was consistent with the goal of rehabilitation and made the process less adversarial. The nature of the juvenile system also allowed the child to re-enter society afresh. 33 Simply stated, the juvenile system was designed to provide whatever was necessary to give children another chance.
34
The original scope of the juvenile system was somewhat limited and not intended to deal with major offenders, as evidenced by the Illinois Juvenile Court 26 Id. 27 Id. at 1258-59. 28 McCarthy, supra note 22, at 641. 29 Guttman, supra note 21, at 512. 31 Guttman, supra note 21, at 511. 32 Cintron, supra note 21, at 1259; Guttman, supra note 21, at 511. 33 Guttman, supra note 21, at 511. 34 Id. at 512.
Act, 35 one of the first American juvenile acts. 36 Instead, the intent was to deal with minor offenders who had the potential for future criminal behavior. 37 From there, however, the scope of juvenile acts across the country began to expand. By 1933, the Pennsylvania juvenile court had original jurisdiction over all crimes committed within the Commonwealth by children under the age of sixteen, except for murder.
38
The juvenile system continued to evolve procedurally as well. In the case In re Gault, 39 the United States Supreme Court held that juveniles were to be afforded certain procedural due process rights, such as the right to notice of charges, to counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privilege against self-incrimination. 40 The Court in Gault noted that the denial of procedural rights frequently resulted in arbitrariness rather than the juvenile system's proclaimed goal of "careful, compassionate, individualized treatment."
41
Furthermore, three years later in In re Winship, 42 the Supreme Court held that a finding of "delinquency" must be made beyond a reasonable doubt, instead of the lower, civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence. 43 The addition of these procedural rights altered the original form of juvenile proceedings, making them more formal and adversarial. 44 Along with the procedural changes came the modern notion that the goal of the juvenile court should be to hold juveniles accountable for their actions; thus, the rehabilitative approach has been somewhat abandoned in favor of an expansion of the scope and authority of the juvenile justice system. 
B. The Juvenile Transfer Mechanism
Initially, transfers from juvenile court to criminal court were the exception; however, they have become increasingly common today. 46 The rationale behind the originally limited use of the transfer mechanism was that "children should be protected and rehabilitated rather than subjected to the harshness of the criminal system because children, all children, are worth redeeming." 47 In those extenuating circumstances, however, when the transfer mechanism was necessary, courts employed it where the juvenile offender was not found to be amenable to treatment in the juvenile system. it determines the juvenile's relationship with the criminal justice system and greatly affects his future. 51 Indeed, the decision of whether to transfer the case affects more than just the forum. It determines whether the juvenile will be afforded the "special rights and immunities" of juvenile court and whether he will come away with an adult criminal conviction and all of the accompanying consequences.
52
III. CURRENT PENNSYLVANIA LAW GOVERNING JUVENILE TRANSFERS
The Pennsylvania Juvenile Act 53 governs transfers from criminal court to juvenile court in Pennsylvania. 54 The self-proclaimed purpose of the Act is to "provide for children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision, care and rehabilitation which provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses committed and the development of competencies to enable children to become responsible and productive members of the community." 55 Pennsylvania employs a form of legislative waiver that automatically excludes juveniles charged with certain crimes from the juvenile court and directly transfers them to the adult court. 56 The criminal court, for instance, has original jurisdiction over acts of murder. 57 Additionally, there are several other offenses enumerated in § 6302 that do not constitute "delinquent acts" and, thus, give the criminal court original jurisdiction. 58 Section 6322 goes on to state that in determining whether to transfer a case charging murder, or any of the offenses excluded from the definition of "delinquent act," the burden of proof is upon the juvenile to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer 51 Kent, 383 U.S. at 560; see also Guttman, supra note 21, at 513-14. 52 Cintron, supra note 21, at 1261 (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 556).
53 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § § 6301-6375 (2006). 54 Id. § 6355. 55 Id. § 6301(b)(2). 56 Cintron, supra note 21, at 1267-68.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6322 (2006).
58 Those offenses include conduct where the child was fifteen years or older at the time and a deadly weapon was used during a rape, involuntary deviant sexual intercourse, aggravated assault, robbery, robbery of a motor vehicle, aggravated indecent assault, kidnapping, voluntary manslaughter, or attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to commit murder or any of these crimes. Additionally, a child will be subject to criminal proceedings if he was fifteen years or older and had been previously adjudicated delinquent of any of the above-mentioned conduct. Summary offenses do not constitute "delinquent acts." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (2006).
will serve the public interest. 59 In determining whether the child has satisfied his burden, the court is to consider the factors set forth in § 6355(a)(4)(iii).
60
Section 6355(a)(4) states that the court may transfer the case from juvenile to criminal court if there is a prima facie case that the child committed the delinquent act alleged, it would be a felony if committed by an adult, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the public interest is served by the transfer of the case for criminal prosecution, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is not mentally retarded or mentally ill. 61 In determining whether the public interest will be served, the court shall consider several factors, 62 the most contentious of which is typically "whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile. Id. § 6355(a)(4)(iii). 63 Id. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(G The trial court ultimately held that Brown was not likely to be rehabilitated.
75
While the court noted that it was not concluding as a matter of law that the child must confess, 76 it stated:
[W]e find agreement on the conclusion that rehabilitation requires taking responsibility for the underlying offense; and, persuasive reasoning from Dr. O'Brien that the taking of such responsibility is unlikely to occur, thus making the prospects of rehabilitation within the confines of the juvenile court jurisdiction likely to be unsuccessful. 77 Therefore, after considering the factors of § 6355(a)(4)(iii) and finding that, under § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(G), Brown would not likely be rehabilitated in the juvenile system, the court held that he failed to meet his burden of proving that a transfer to juvenile court would serve the public interest.
78
As illustrated by Jordan Brown's case, the Pennsylvania transfer statute essentially requires the juvenile to admit to committing the crime in order to be decertified to juvenile court. The juvenile must take responsibility for his actions and show remorse, but the situation becomes complicated where the juvenile did not commit the crime. This is where the Hobson's choice 79 arises for the juvenile.
The child must show that he is amenable to treatment in the juvenile facility in order to be tried in juvenile court. In Jordan Brown's case, he insisted that he did 73 Id. at *5. 74 Id. 75 Id. at *6. 76 Id. Prior juvenile transfer challenges in Pennsylvania did not come to this. Often, courts rested their decisions to uphold the denial of transfer on other grounds, rather than on whether the juvenile pled guilty or maintained his innocence. One oft-stated basis that courts use to find that the juvenile was properly placed in the adult system is his age. Often times, the older the juvenile is, the less likely it is that the court will find that he can be rehabilitated before the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction, which occurs at age twenty-one. 81 By making age the main focus of the decision, the court does not have to make the fact that the juvenile maintained his innocence a central issue. In other cases, such considerations as insufficient time for rehabilitation in the juvenile system for older juveniles and defendants' prior criminal or juvenile record have influenced courts to uphold denials of decertification. 82 The prior offenses show that the juvenile system has previously failed in attempting to rehabilitate the child. 89 Id. at 38. 90 Id. at 39-40. 91 Id. at 42. 92 Id. at 50. 93 Id. at 55-56.
In contrast, Jordan Brown had no prior offenses 94 and he was twelve years old at the time of the decertification hearing, leaving nine years for potential rehabilitation in the juvenile center. 95 While he may not have shown remorse for the victim, this was due to the fact that he maintained his innocence. Therefore, the trial court in Brown I seemed to treat as dispositive the fact that Jordan would not take responsibility for his actions.
The Supreme Court of California, in a case involving a similar statute and similar predicament, found that its juvenile transfer statute violated juveniles' Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination due to the untenable choice they were forced to make. The court likened the juvenile in a decertification hearing to a probationer, noting that a "policy underlying the privilege against selfincrimination which is undermined by forcing a probationer to choose between the privilege and his opportunity to be heard at his revocation hearing is our 'unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of selfaccusation, perjury or contempt.'" 96 The court conceded that although a minor is not faced with contempt if he remains silent at his decertification hearing, he may find himself in a similar situation.
97
The consequences of this trilemma could be devastating for the juvenile: unpalatable alternatives runs counter to our historic aversion to cruelty reflected in the privilege against self-incrimination.
98
Therefore, while the Pennsylvania statute does not explicitly require that a juvenile admit to the crime to be decertified to juvenile court, it does so implicitly. Juveniles in Pennsylvania who wish to maintain their innocence are thus subjected to the "cruel trilemma" of which the California Supreme Court spoke. 99 For this reason, the determination of amenability in the juvenile court system should not be based on whether the juvenile has taken responsibility for his actions or admitted to the crime. Instead, and more appropriately, Pennsylvania courts should focus on factors such as the defendant's age and prior history within the juvenile system in determining amenability.
B. There Is No Immunity Provision in the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act to Protect the Juvenile's Right Against SelfIncrimination During Transfer Proceedings
Another constitutional safeguard is providing juveniles with use immunity for statements made during transfer proceedings. Courts across the United States have found that requiring a juvenile to make the unfair choice that Jordan Brown had to make, without the assurance that the statement would be inadmissible for use in transfer proceedings or in a subsequent trial, violates the child's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 100 While Pennsylvania does have a provision which gives immunity to a juvenile's statements from being used in a subsequent trial, it does not protect the child from use of the statements in the transfer proceedings. The Pennsylvania Juvenile Act does not provide immunity to a juvenile testifying at his transfer hearing. Although the absence of such a provision does not affect our decision as to constitutionality, we believe that inclusion of an immunity provision would be prudent and merits legislative consideration.
106
Therefore, while the lack of immunity of the juvenile's statements at this stage in the proceedings did not affect the court's decision regarding constitutionality, specifically the juvenile's claim that the burden was impermissibly placed on him, the court made clear that it would be wise for the legislature to immunize such statements. It is unclear how the court would have ruled if the juvenile had explicitly challenged the Fifth Amendment selfincrimination issue.
including but not limited to, that which is court ordered, shall be admitted into evidence against the child on the issue of whether the child committed a delinquent act under this chapter or on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding.
Transfer proceedings do not determine whether the child committed a delinquent act, nor do they go toward the issue of guilt. Therefore, such proceedings are not included under this provision. 102 Commonwealth v. Cotto, 708 A.2d 806 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 103 Id. at 813. 104 A.L., 638 A.2d 814. 105 Cotto, 708 A.2d at 815 n.3 (citing A.L., 638 A.2d at 822). 106 Id. (emphasis added).
In the Matter of William M.
Other jurisdictions have tackled the same issue that Jordan Brown faced more directly. Most recently, the Supreme Court of Nevada, in In the Matter of William M., ruled that requiring a juvenile to admit to a crime in order to overcome the presumption of adult certification violates the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. 107 In that case, the seventeen-year-old defendant maintained his innocence, and the juvenile court found that he did not rebut the presumption of certification in adult court. 108 As in Cotto, the court noted that the result of a transfer hearing is not an adjudication of guilt. 109 However, as both the Supreme
Court of Nevada and the California Supreme Court have recognized, "the certification of a juvenile offender to an adult court has been accurately characterized as 'the worst punishment the juvenile system is empowered to inflict.'" 110 While the statute in Nevada required a somewhat more explicit admission of guilt, 111 the fact remains that the Pennsylvania statute has the same effect. By requiring the juvenile to take responsibility for his actions and show remorse in order to prove that he is amenable to treatment in the juvenile facility, the juvenile is implicitly required to admit guilt.
Christopher P. v. State
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in Christopher P. v. State held that a juvenile's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when the court ordered the child to discuss the charges against him during a psychological evaluation to be used to determine amenability to treatment in transfer proceedings.
112 While the state of New Mexico contended that the transfer proceedings were nonadversarial and intended only to determine forum, not guilt, the court mimicked the sentiments of the 1985) ).
111 "The plain language of NRS 62B.390(3)(b) requires that a juvenile present clear and convincing evidence that his or her actions were substantially influenced by either substance abuse or emotional or behavioral problems. Accordingly, a juvenile must present evidence that his substance abuse or emotional or behavioral problems substantially influenced his commission of the charged criminal actions. In other words, to rebut the presumptive certification, the juvenile must incriminate himself." William M., 196 P.3d at 464. M. 113 The court noted the impact of the transfer proceedings, stating that the transfer decision "does more than determine a judicial forum for an accused youth. It invokes a jurisprudential philosophy that governs the nature of the proceedings as well as the purpose and severity of the sanctions." 114 The court concluded that the protections of the Fifth Amendment extend to official questions in any kind of proceeding, the answers to which may incriminate the juvenile in future criminal proceedings. 
v. Superior Court
Finally, the Supreme Court of California addressed a similar issue in Ramona R. v. Superior Court, when it found that in order to comply with the constitutional protections of the Fifth Amendment, use immunity must apply to the state's juvenile statute. 116 In that case, the seventeen-year-old juvenile defendant was charged with brutally murdering her guardian. 117 The child refused to be interviewed by a probation officer and declined to testify at the transfer hearing.
118
Furthermore, counsel for the defendant did not introduce into evidence a psychiatric evaluation of the child, as there was no immunity provision in place for potentially incriminating statements. 119 In addition to recognizing that the lack of immunity subjected the child to the "cruel trilemma" of choosing between selfincrimination, perjury, and contempt, the court noted that it also "impermissibly lighten No Pennsylvania statute prohibits the use of incriminating statements made by a juvenile during decertification proceedings.
122 While the Pennsylvania statute does not explicitly require or compel juveniles to admit to the crime, it implicitly compels the unfair choice of either admitting guilt to show amenability and stay in juvenile court or maintaining innocence and going to the adult criminal system. Therefore, the juvenile's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is called into question. Because the Pennsylvania statute has no immunity provision to protect the child, his constitutional rights are violated. Pennsylvania should enact such a provision in order to bring the Juvenile Act in conformity with the protections and policies of the right against self-incrimination.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF REFORMING THE PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE ACT
Removing the implicit requirement that juveniles must admit to the crime to be decertified to juvenile court may result in the courts finding more juveniles amenable to treatment in the juvenile facility. While there are certainly arguments in support of certifying juveniles to the adult criminal system, the stronger arguments, especially in terms of policy and current societal norms, counsel in favor of keeping juveniles in the juvenile system.
A. Children Are Psychologically Different Than Adults
Many of the rationales for keeping juveniles in the juvenile system stem from the psychological differences between children and adults. Robert Schwartz, cofounder of the Juvenile Law Center, has commented on the implications of Jordan Brown's case and about juvenile transfers in general. Schwartz cites to a study by the MacArthur Foundation Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 123 which found that "teenagers are less blameworthy than adults, and that their capacities change significantly over the course of adolescence." 124 In other words, the study suggested that juveniles simply cannot process information and plan a crime like an adult. 125 Schwartz goes on to state that during adolescence, children "struggle with their immaturity, undeveloped decision-making abilities, impulsiveness, lack of future orientation and susceptibility to negative peer The Court also heavily relied upon the psychological differences between children and adults, noting three main differences. The first is a lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility in juveniles as compared to adults; 133 the Court stated that this often leads juveniles to make "impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions."
134 Additionally, because of this, youths tend to act more recklessly than do adults. 135 As evidence of the state-recognized 126 Id. differences between the maturity of juveniles and adults, the Court noted that children cannot vote, serve on juries, or marry without parental consent.
136
The second psychological divergence between juveniles and adults that the Court discussed is that youths are more susceptible to negative influences and peer pressure.
137 This is due to the fact that youths do not have as much control over their own environment and surroundings. 138 Lastly, the Court noted that the third difference between the psychological functioning of juveniles and adults is that the character of a juvenile is "not as well formed as that of an adult." 139 For these reasons, the Court found that children should not be subject to the death penalty. It noted that it would be wrong from a moral standpoint "to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed."
140
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court considered the constitutionality of imposing a life sentence without the possibility of parole on a non-homicide juvenile offender. 141 Relying on Roper, the Court reiterated that a juvenile's behavior is "not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult." 142 The
Court also pointed to several of the same arguments made in Roper, such as psychological evidence and the ineffectiveness of harsh punishment as a deterrent mechanism, as somewhat mitigating a juvenile's behavior. 143 Finally, in terms of rehabilitation, the Court found that a life imprisonment sentence without the possibility of parole would not achieve the goal of deterrence. It noted that "by denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, Roper and Graham show the Court's reluctance to treat juveniles and adults exactly the same way. Whether it be rooted in public policy or moral and societal standards, the cases show the Court struggling with, and ultimately finding against, subjecting juvenile offenders to certain aspects of the adult criminal justice system. The same reasoning applied in Roper and Graham can also be applied to modern juvenile transfer cases, such as that of Jordan Brown.
B. Children Are Not Competent Defendants
Furthermore, researchers at the MacArthur Network found an additional, but somewhat different, psychological reason why youths should not be tried in adult criminal court. That reason is that children are not competent enough to be defendants and can be likened to mentally ill persons not competent to stand trial. They lack adjudicative competence-that is, "the ability of a defendant to stand trial having 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" 145 The researchers argue that children lack the capacity and ability to consult with their attorneys and shape trial strategy. 146 The Court in Graham considered this as well, finding that juveniles have " [d] ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel." 147 
C. The Criminal Justice System May Do More Harm Than Good to Juveniles
Finally, there is the fear that "young offenders given adult time will prove to be greater menaces to society when released after having learned the criminal ropes from older, tougher inmates." 148 Studies have shown that juveniles transferred to sentences, such as life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, are quite severe when applied to youth because "[a] 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only." 159 In
Pennsylvania, a concurrence in Kocher, authored by Justice Flaherty, expressed that Pennsylvania's public policy would not allow for the criminal prosecution of a nine-year-old child. 160 Justice Flaherty found the attempt at prosecuting a child as young as Cameron Kocher shocking to the conscience. 161 Furthermore, scholars have criticized transfer laws on the basis that "there is little reason to believe that the juvenile system can accurately predict which juveniles are, indeed, beyond rehabilitative efforts and should therefore be remanded to the adult system in the name of public safety." 162 In light of our society's evolving standards of decency, 163 condemning extremely young children such as Jordan Brown to long, harsh sentences in the adult criminal system is contrary to American public policy and should be avoided whenever possible.
VI. CONCLUSION
While reasonable minds may disagree as to whether Jordan Brown murdered Kenzie Houk, the Fifth Amendment guarantees his right to maintain his innocence. Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act implicitly requires the juvenile to admit guilt in order to show amenability in the juvenile facility. Moreover, the statute contains no safeguards, such as immunity, to protect the child in the decertification hearing from incriminating statements he may make. The psychological differences between children and adults, along with issues concerning adjudicative competency, the effectiveness of the adult system on juveniles, and general public policy, counsel in favor of keeping juveniles in the juvenile system. The legislature in Pennsylvania should look to the evolving standards of decency in the United States in reforming the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act and protecting the Fifth Amendment rights of juveniles. As the original philosophy of the juvenile court system proclaimed, the state should not be an enemy of the child, but a protector and ultimate guardian.
